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This paper examines the involvement of Indian diasporic communities in the dynamics
of economic development and population displacement within the Indian subcontinent
itself. I argue that the category ofdiaspora canhelp to critically interrogate and challenge
traditional notions of development and displacement and in doing so help to illuminate
the complexities of such processes in the light of globalisation and transnationalism. I
exnmine the historical context of diasporas and their involvement in processes of
deuelopment and consider questions of identity, place, home and connection between
people and the nation-state. I also look at the specific case of Indian diasporas and the
impact they have had on the financial and cultural development of India in the recent
past. Wile much of the current research on the connections between development and
diasporas woildwide has focused on remittances, this paper argues for a wider
understanding of both "diasporic capital" 
- 
including investments, property ownership
and trade- and of"diasporic culture" 
- 
as demonstratedby globalised patterns oftravel,
tourism, communications, cultural production and the creation of living spaces with a
self- consciously transnational aesthetic.
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This paper seeks to explore the increasingly complex transnational relationships
between immigrant, expatriate or diasporic communities and development in their
ancestral or putative "homelands". In recent years such links have become an
increasing focal point of academic inquiry (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt; Atkinson;
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Maimbo and Ratha; Zstergaard-Nielsen; Engberg-Pederson, Nyberg-Sorenson and
Van Hear). Numerous national and regional governments as well as development
agencies and international financial institutions have similarly identified diasporas as
integral components to future developmental visions, as a stable alternative to foreign
direct investment and in the face of the global trend towards diminishing foreign aid
(Vertovec; Van Doorn; Rauch). Much of the research and discussion on development
and diasporas has focused primarily on economic instruments such as remittances,
money sent by an individual or family living in a (relatively) prosperous country to
family members in their country of origin. Recent figures show the global trend of
remittance transfers to be both substantial and on the increase. Recorded remittance
flows grew from US$66 billion in 2000 to over US$268 billion in 2005 (Ratha
"Remittance Flows" 3; "Remittances" 42), with some observers estimating a further
35 to 250 per cent of these amounts transferred through informal channels (Freund
and Spatafora l). Stereoqpical situations might describe migrant workers from Latin
America and the Caribbean, domestic workers from the Philippines, or skilled
craftspeople and professionals from India who work in the Persian Gulf, the USA or
Western Europe and send a portion of their income home to help their families with
specific needs: food, clothing, building a bigger (and better) house, financing a local
water or electrification project, donating funds towards a community hospital or
school and so on. Yet there are as many divisions within diasporic groups and
variations in the forms of diasporic developmental assistance as there are between
sending and receiving countries, distinctions in their identity, nature and character,
differences based on class, gender, ethnicity and culture that affect a given diasporic
community's relationship to development in their putative homeland. This paper will
argue, therefore, for a wider understanding of this phenomenon through "diasporic
capital and cultural flows" a broad category that encompasses a range of both
economic practices and social, ideological and political projects.
This paper examines several key and emerging questions regarding diasporas and
development. For example, at a time of intensified attempts by hometown
associations and national governments to court 6migr6s to help build neighbour-
hoods and nations, how do diasporic communities engage in activities that aid
development? Equally important, what types of development do diasporic funds and
influences help to enable? Moreover, while the desire to help families, friends and





associated with such assistance? In particular, what of
development activities and projects which have significant population displacement
or ecological degradation effects? How then might diasporic communities become
enmeshed in a paradoxical dilemma, one in which their own connection to "home"
and desire to improve it or strengthen their ties to it results in turn, in the disruption
of another local community's equally strong link to specific places?
Diasporic communities may take many forms and engage in a substantial range of
activities, yet "the diaspora" continues to resonate for many scholars, social
movements and national governments as a primary locus for examining transnational
practices, particularly in terms of global capital, migration and political as well as
cultural connections. What do diasporas and their activities tell us about identity,
citizenship and community 
- 
indeed, what do they tell us about the nation-state
itselfr How are our notions of borders and boundaries disrupted by groups whose
idea of a homeland does not fit easily onto a map or a census? This paper explores
such questions by looking at the involvement of diasporic communities of Indian
origin in the dynamics of economic development and population displacement in
contemporary India. The principal contention of the paper is that the category of
diaspora can help to critically interrogate and challenge traditional notions of not
only development and displacement, but also of citizenship itself. The focus on
diaspora in my examination moves beyond looking at displacement as a simple
binary of forced evictions and ongoing migration patterns and instead draws
attention to the points of departure themselves as well as the reasons for an ongoing
connection to "home'1 Similarly, examining the historical and evolving links between
diasporas and development helps to think about development beyond the trope of
the public sector infrastructure project (the dam or the highway) and simultaneously
problematises what private sector development might entail. Finally, exploring the
relationship between diaspora, development and displacement challenges our
understanding of what citizenship, belonging and rights might mean in an
increasingly globalised world.
Categories such as "citizens" and "the nation-state" are often meant to fully
comprehend or at least represent the complex relationship between geography,
politics and habitation; yet the connection between people and places is never so
straightforward or easily circumscribed. To where or what does one belong? How
are claims of authenticity in terms of pedigree or linkage to a particular soil or
community to be judged and by whom? The contestation evident in the diverse
ways that the "Indian" 
- 
global, local or otherwise 
- 
is today conceptualised
demonstrates the complexity of these issues. Diasporic Indians 
- 
called by a host of
names including "desis", "NRIs" (Non-Resident Indians), "PIOs" (Persons of
Indian Origin), "OBIs" (Overseas-Born Indians) and a plethora of other acronyms
and nicknames 
- 
comprise an often highly mythologised group. Represented
narrowly in much of both diasporic and subcontinental culture and politics as a
highly successful, mainly professional group of doctors, engineers, accountants,
business entrepreneurs, IT workers, academics and scientists, it is these often
narrowly construed and intensely idealised Indians whose assumed tastes, interests
and financial capacities often drive many current developments within India.
Crossing the border has been made easier for this diasporic Indian, as has moving
money across time zones and currencies. The diaspora plays an ever-greater role in
Indian politics, whether internally or on the world stage. The current boom in land
speculation and housing development in and around major Indian cities has also
been spurred in large part by the growth of "Western-influenced" condominium
projects that often cater to an NRI audience and their assumed tastes. And in
Bollywood films and television programmes in both India and many overseas
communities, the NRI has become an increasingly important and visible character.
While not necessarily citizens of India, diasporic Indians have even been awarded
official recognition and by the Indian state and their historical and cultural
attachments to the region are rewarded accordingly; for example, with the ability to
own immovable property or obtain special entry visas. In such ways, the diasporic
Indian occupies an ever-growing role in the life-space of India both home and
away.
And yet this prominence does not come without its costs. What of all those who
do not fit into the mythologised view of the NRI? What of the many millions of
Indians or persons of Indian origin overseas who are not doctors or academics or
software engineers? There are indeed a far greater proportion of NRIs and PIOs
who are descendents of indentured labourers in the Caribbean or South-east Asia,
or who live and work in West Asia/Middle East as wage labourers, trades people
and domestic help, and many others who do not conform to the "success story" or
"model minority" view of South Asian emigration and resettlement (Prashad). A
narrow stereotype of the Indian diaspora, reinforced through political and
economic practice as well as cultural texts, serves to obscure the diversity of the
diasporic experience and its many manifestations. Within India as well, the
potential of the diaspora is not only to do good works. There exists equally the
possibility of problematic and even harmful effects: the diasporat involvement in
development can lead to political disenfranchisement or manipulation, economic
harm and physical dislocation. In the case of housing developments, for example,
one sees that the populations being displaced in order to construct luxury
condominium complexes marketed towards diasporic Indians are often either
Indian citizens or undocumented migrants and refugees from neighbouring regions.
Many have been settled in the area for generations, whether with formal property
rights or as squatters. Their eviction for the purposes of constructing luxury
condominium towers for overseas Indians or for those who wish to "live like them"
highlights an ongoing contest over the notion of "home".
The conflict between identities and rights, between hyphenated overseas Indians
(-Canadians, 
-Americans, -British) and Indian "citizens" forces one to consider
who is excluded from claims on home and place in this particular developmental
process. Diasporic populations feel intimately connected to "place", hence their
continued involvement with development in their "home countries". Soon-to-be-
displaced populations within those "home countries" feel no less attached to such
"places". Should the attachment to place professed by one take precedence over that
of the other? Are there ways of balancing these competing claims on space, place
and home? This paper examines these questions in two parts. The first section
looks at diasporas and development in both the historical and current context. The
second part of the paper examines the history of Indian diaspora and recent
attempts by both regional and national governments to woo their capital.
Diasporas and Development An Overview
Defining and Distinguishing Diasporas
Diasporic communities have existed for centuries and in many ways complicate
modern notions of geographical and political boundaries. They are multi-faceted
social organisations, interwoven in the contemporary context with legacies of
colonialism and emerging trends towards cultural, economic, political and social
globalisation. Diasporas take many forms beyond the traditional notion of persecuted
victims forced to flee their homeland, though the enduring image of diasporic
communities remains bound not to the notion of migration, but rather to that of
forced displacement. It is the so-called "victim diasporas" (Cohen) that dominate our
view such as Jewish groups persecuted across Europe through the centuries, Africans
scattered by slavery over the Americas and the Caribbean, or more recently,
Armenians and Palestinians, displaced by genocide or deprived of a homeland.r
But in recent years many other groups have increasingly been described by the
category of diaspora. Alternative labels are often used synonymously transmigrants,
6migr6s, immigrants and expatriates among them 
- 
though these terms describe
sometimes very different forms of population movements. Regardless of the reasons
for leaving, it is nonetheless true that generations of communities have flourished
away from homelands, retaining strong economic and political ties to their places of
origin and often a distinct cultural identity (Levitt and Waters). Scholars have
documented many such cases throughout history, and point to similar examples in
the contemporary context. These include trading communities such as Lebanese,
Chinese, Italian groups who migrated to distant shores, labourers (indentured or
otherwise) from various parts of the Indian subcontinent who journeyed to Africa,
the Caribbean and South-east Asia, and functionaries and soldiers from ancient
Rome and colonial Britain, Russia, France and Belgiurn who spread throughout their
empires. More recently, the postcolonial period has seen massive migration from
former peripheries towards self-described cores East and West Indians in Britain,
North Africans and South-east Asians in France, Central Asians in Russia, to name
but a few. And indeed migrant labour across the world today represents one of the
most significant flows of population in human history from South Asians in the
Persian Gulf to Latin Americans in the USA, and Eastern Europeans in Western
Europe and many others besides (Braziel and Mannur; Castles and Miller; Van Hear).
The latter example does not only mean seasonal workers who return to their "home"
countries following the expiration of a contract or the harvest of a crop (though it
might in some instances). Increasingly, whether arriving as legal or undocumented
labour, such migrant workers have stayed on in host countries, settling in discrete,
identifiable communities and sending financial support to their families left behind
(Itzigsohn and Saucedo; Levitt and Waters).It is indeed this dialectic, of connections
to both a "new" and an "old" home simultaneously that is characteristic of diasporas,
no matter what their origin.
Diasporic D evelopment Initiqtiv es
There is a long history of different 6migr6 groups not simply assimilating and
disappearing into a melting pot of their new host country, but ratheE participating in
efforts to materially and ideologically restructure their putative homelands. Some
scholars have defined this dynamic as an essentially transnational one; a "process by
which transmigrants, through their daily activities, forge and sustain multi-stranded
social, economic, and political relations that link together their societies of origin and
settlement, and through which they create transnational social fields that cross
national borders" (Basch, Glick-Schiller and Szanton-Blanc 6). This participation has
taken many forms, including the provision of goods and services and in-kind labour
to their former communities, moral support for ideological projects and material
economic assistance in the form of remittances and direct investments.
The importance of remittances in particular for the world economy has become
increasingly apparent in recent years. A growing body of literature has noted the
growth of remittances in both nominal terms and as relative to the receiving
countries' Gross Domestic Product (IMF; Maimbo and Ratha; Orozco; Solimano). Of
the US$268 billion in workers' remittances in 2005, over US$167 billion accounted
for capital flows to the developing world, second only to foreign direct investment as
a source of external funding, and far outstripping traditional development aid (Ratha
"Remittance Flows" 3). And unlike foreign aid, remittances are not "tied" to the self-
interest of donor nations or the loan conditionalities of multinational institutions like
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
For many countries 
- 
and indeed for some entire regions 
- 
remittances have
become an integral part of economic survival. In recent years India, Mexico and
China have consistently ranked among the top countries receiving the largest share of
remittances globally. Regionally, the two largest sets of global remittance flows occur
between North America and Latin America and the Caribbean on the one hand and
the Persian Gulf and South Asia on the other. With reference to such important
trends, Guillermo Perry, the World Bank Chief Economist for Latin America and the
Caribbean argues that:
[foreign] direct investment and remittances are key for Latin America and the
Caribbean as it remains more sensitive than other regions to external shocks due to
vulnerabilities to capital flow reversals. At a time when debt flows are falling,
remittances represent one of the most stable sources of income for the region.
(World Bank "Foreign Investment")
The flows of remittance funds from the USA to Mexico as well as the rest of Latin
America and the Caribbean have grown to such an extent that these transnational
practices have formed an important part of the national debate on immigration and
cross-border labour policies in the USA, with some populist critics charging migrant
workers with economic disloyalty for sending money home (Dobbs). In 2002, the
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs of the United States Senate,
noted that Hispanic families in the USA sent an average of US$200 seven times a year
to relatives in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Committee moreover noted that
exorbitant fees charged by money transfer services cost those sending remittances
over US$3.5 billion in commissions alone (Committee on Banking). Commercial
banks are now attempting to capture as much of this lucrative market as possible, and
in recent years transaction costs for formal remittance channels have in fact reduced
substantially (Ratha "Remittances" 43). Despite this, it remains a fact that a large
portion of remittances flow through informal channels to friends and family of
migrant workers, through a complex network of well-established regional systems of
credit, money-lending and exchange such as hawala in South Asia and fei ch'ien in
China (Buencamino and Gorbunov). This presents, in the mind of some economists,
both an obstacle and an opportunity:
Harnessing the development impact of these flows with an efficient and effective
formal public and private remittance infrastructure in the face of an active parallel
informal structure is today's principal policy challenge for governments in the
region 
- 
a challenge governments in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are
taking seriously. (Maimbo and Ratha 62)
Not all see remittances and diasporic capital as an unalloyed boon, however. Some
critics suggest that workers remittances in fact have a negative impact on receiving
countries' economies in the form of a real exchange rate appreciation, artificially
inflating the value of domestic currencies and decreasing productive capacities (Pozo
and Amuedo-Dorantes). Additionally, though recognition of the importance of
remittances has grown considerably throughout the academic and poliry commu-
nities in recent years, precise calculations of their volume remain difficult. The
international financial community has implemented several measures to try and
rectify the situation. Following requests by the G-8 countries to improve remittance
statistics a number of international bodies including the UN, World Bank, IMF and
the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) have established an international
working group called the Technical Sub-Group on the Movement of Persons to try
and capture remittance statistics more accurately (World Bank "Foreign Investment"l
Global Economic Prospects). Recorded in the balance of payments current account as
either "private transfer receipts" or "unrequited capital transfers", most remittance
numbers fail to account for more informal money transfers, for foreign exchange that
is brought in personally (much of which is recorded as the receipts of tourism) and
for personal goods. They are still mainly calculated as the sum of workers'
remittances, compensation of employees and migrant transfers. Some critics estimate
that roughly half of the actual amount sent by foreign workers and 6migr6s fails to be
measured by contemporary national accounting statistics (Debabrata and Kapur).
Similarly, given that it is impossible to tell the origin of deposits in external currency
accounts and the diasporic nature of much "foreign" direct investment is unclear,
these sources of diasporic capital are likewise prone to underestimation; indeed,
despite the best efforts of the international financial community it is likely that the
true extent of worker remittances will remain an imprecise measure.
Dependence upon remittances to provide a stable economic support as Perry
suggests seems therefore fraught with risk, since their true scale is difficult to gauge,
let alone trying to predict their shifting behaviour. Far from insulating economies
against "external shocks", there is mounting evidence that in some situations
diasporic capital flows can indeed exacerbate crisis situations (Krishnamurty). And as
will be discussed presently, there are also potentially serious ethical issues concerning
diasporic investments and remittances in terms of their differential and sometimes
deleterious effects upon a receiving country's population. Moreover, remittances are
not, of course, the only part of the story. An exploration of these dynamics demands a
wider understanding of the phenomenon of the diaspora-development connection
beyond remittances to include both diasporic capital and cultural flows, a reading
which would include a wide range of political, economic and social practices. As
Kapur suggests:
[it] is worth asking whether a less visible, quantifiable, and tangible form of
remittances 
- 
namely social remittances and the flow of ideas 
- 
have a more critical
impact than their pecuniary counterpart. The overseas experience must have some
cognitive effect on migrants. At the same time, the communications revolution has
led to an exponential growth of transnational telephone calls and email, as well as a
sharp increase in international travel. As a result, not just elites but social groups at
the lower end of the social spectrum are exposed to new information, not just new
ways of making or selling things, but also new views of what is acceptable in terms
of service standards, the role of the state, or the behaviour of politicians. The
cumulative effect of millions of conversations 
- 
akin to filling a pond one drop at a
time 
- 
is interesting to speculate upon. (Kapur in Maimbo and Ratha 357)
It is towards this broader developmental impact that diasporas might have and
relationship to discourses on identity, modernity, migration, citizenship and
belonging that I turn to in the next section of this paper.
Citizenship, Diasporas, Home and the Nation-State
Yet despite the potential problem of remittance flows, given the sheer (estimated)
volume it is no surprise perhaps that nation-states the world over are salivating at the
prospect of capturing income from departed sons and daughters. As part of the desire
to capture these untamed and often informal capital flows, countries have gone so far
as to offer an extended form of citizenship to diasporic communities (for example,
the Person of Indian Origin cards described in the next section), playrng on their
ongoing attachments to a notion of home. But it is important not to confuse a
longing for "home" and "place" with some kind of primordial connection to the
nation-state. Diasporas certainly predate the modern post-Tieaty of Westphalia
notion of the nation-state, as the historical record clearly demonstrates. There is
nothing to suggest that an attachment to place arises from a flight across lines on a
map or displacement from onet nationality. But in an era where the nation-state is
seen by many as the ultimate expression of community and its existence appears
inevitable (though somewhat altered by globalisation), it seems only logical that
migration from the nation would be the point (in some views) at which diasporas are
created. Indeed, as Anderson has argued, the very success of the idea of the nation-
state has been in first harnessing the latent power of "nationalist" sentiments within
the political framework of the state, and second, thereafter exercising control over
geography, history, demography and the legitimate use of coercive force in the name
of that nationalist sentiment (16344). The "map, the census and the museum",
Anderson suggests, have been amongst the most effective tools in regulating
geographical boundaries, population movements and cultural memories within a
world system of nation-states.
But diasporas disrupt this tidy view of nation, narration and belonging. Take the
case of refugee diasporas, for example. These may indeed be a group of people
forced by conflict or persecution to flee lands and homes to which they have long-
standing political, economic and cultural ties 
- 
but it is more often homes that are
left behind, rather than nation-states. As a community in exile, refugee diasporas
are often defined by their nationality 
- 
Somalis, Afghans, Iranians 
- 
yet are their
connections to "home" predicated on the nation-state? Certainly within the larger
diasporic population, the link is not so clear. Try as many national governments
might, attempts to fundraise for various nation-building projects in putative
homelands have been far less successful than the efforts of hometown associations
or the more common informal transfers of funds between family members and
friends (Astergaard-Nielsen; Orozco). The ties that bind are more often to place
than they are to the grand notions of an imagined community in the form of the
nation-state. The exile that the refugee communities experience is from their homes
and the lives that they are forced to try and reconstruct might be built as much in
another part of their country of origin as in a distant land 
- 
though both might be
equally foreign to them. The displaced from development projects from central
India often end up living in cities on the coasts, for example, in discrete, if often
wretched communities. In other cases, populations fleeing conflict and violence
cross an international border to become refugees in neighbouring countries whose
populations might be quite similar in cultural practices and beliefs to them and
whose "difference" has less to do with nationalism and more with the arbitrary
boundaries of competing colonial powers (as in the case of many African
countries).
All of this is not to say that the nation does not matter. Indeed, for many refugee
diasporas who do not come from a nation-state with which they identifr the dream
instead is of a country of their own, such as elements of the Sikh, Kurdish and Sri
Lankan Tamil diasporas have suggested. Still, the claim to place and home is based
primarily on what De calls the "territorial referent", rather than on the necessity of the
nation-state:
[While] the statehood demand is not a must for nationalism, a territorial referent
is. Nationalism proceeds to define people in terms of shared institutions, economic,
social andlor political (such as language, religion, customs, etc.) and defends or
seeks to increase their autonomy. All the while this demand for autonomy is made
in terms of belonging to a particular territory. Often, to make this demand
compatible with the territorial referent, nationalists mystify the connections by
referring to a remote past (usually heroic) and/or to a better future. Thus, while a
nationalist ideology is conditioned by its location in an actual space and time, it is
also a unique and creative time-space formulation. Quite naturally, therefore,
nationalism can be used by different social groups and classes for different and
often conflicting purposes. (15)
It is in the light of these complex and contested claims to both nationalism and what
might be termed "sub-nationalism", therefore, that the idea of the diaspora must be
evaluated, paying particular attention to the different reasons for departure, the
diverse ongoing connections to "homelands" (real or imagined) and the differences
in experiences of diasporas. Many of these groups, for example, have developed
vibrant, established diasporic communities in their countries of refuge or migration;
others remain marginalised, often continuing to live for decades in camps under less
than ideal conditions and denied the rights and privileges enjoyed by their immediate
neighbours, or segregated into low-wage labour and low-income housing. Examining
the diverse and complex experiences of resettlement, integration and ongoing
relationships with putative homelands is a key component in understanding the
make-up and mentality of diasporas. A focus on these differences is also an important
part of not treating these groups as monolithic entities but rather as varied as any
other community. The next section examines one particular set of experiences of the
diaspora with relation to development in the postcolonial period, those of Indians
overseas.
Wooing Diasporic Capital India's Twenty-First-Century Developmental Visions
Traditionally investment in the bond market is done after looking at security,
liquidity, safety and returns. We will add Emotional Property to tap funds from
NRIs. We would appeal to their emotions and ask them to lend for development in
the motherland. (Raghu)
With these words, the then-Minister for Major Irrigation and Narmada in the Indian
state of Gujarat announced in December 2000 a new strategy aimed at raising money
for public expenditures, in particular the massive scheme to build interlocking dams
in the Narmada Valley of North Western India. The specific objective was to tap the
lucrative NRI market of wealthy expatriates and loyal6migr6s for financial aid to fund
the project. Three years later, in his opening speech to the first Indian Diaspora
conference, held in New Delhi in |anuary 2003, former Prime Minister of India Atal
Behari Vajpayee made clear that the linkage between 6migr6s and development was
both recognised by and a priority for the federal government of India (as it is for
many others elsewhere). He thanked members of the Indian diasporic community for
their contributions to intellectual, financial, cultural and political developments
throughout the world. He also suggested that members of the Indian diaspora played
an important role as ambassadors of goodwill for the Indian state. Vajpayee
repeatedly exhorted 6migr6s to return to India 
- 
in spirit if not in body:
I have always been conscious of the need for India to be sensitive to the hopes,
aspirations and concerns of its vast diaspora. We invite you, not only to share our
vision of India in the new millennium, but also to help us shape its contours. We
do not want only your investment. We also want your ideas. We do not want your
riches; we want the richness of your experience. We can gain from the breadth of
vision that your global exposure has given you.
Though he emphasised that it was not only the wealth of the diaspora that was so
attractive to the Indian state, Vajpayee's assurances that India had a positive
investment climate and was firmly entrenched on a path towards modernisation
and equitable development implied a clear policy of wooing diasporic capital.
Vajpayee also indicated several rewards for the Indian diasporas' support for the
Indian state over a decade of tumultuous economic and political upheavals. Two
years earlier, the Government of India had created an NRI and PIO Division within
its Ministry of External Affairs. The Indian central government also established a
High Level Commission on Indian Diaspora, whose policy recommendations as
released in fanuary 2003 proposed the extension of dual citizenship rights to NRI and
PIO individuals 
- 
though initially only to those residing in the USA, Canada,
European Union member nations, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand,but not the
Middle East or the Gulf. This proposal has since been amended by the current Indian
central government to extend to NRI and PIO individuals within other countries.
A change in government, from the Hindu-right Bharatiya lanata Party, under
whose tenure the above initiatives were launched, to the centre-left United
Progressive Alliance has not significantly changed the Indian state's attitudes towards
the diaspora. In the most recent iteration of the Indian diaspora conference, the
Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, echoed his predecessor Vajpayee's sentiments:
I would like you to reach out and invest in a new India. Invest not just financially,
but intellectually, socially, culturally and, above all, emotionally t. . .] Come engage
with India. (NDTV.com)
This attention paid by the central (as well as by regional governments) to the Indian
diaspora is unsurprising if one considers the size and significance of the diasporic
population. At present, Indian 6migr6s are estimated to number between 25 and 40
million people worldwide (depending, as always, on how one defines inclusion in a
particular diasporic community). And while it is true that many new immigrants
from India to countries such as Canada struggle socially and economically to adjust
to their new surroundings, it is becoming equally apparent that significant sections of
the Indian diaspora across the globe are highly successful and indeed prosperous in
their new homes (Motwani, Gosine and Barot-Motwani). In 2002, India outpaced
Mexico as the country receiving the largest volume of remittances in the world,
totalling over $16 billion (IMF). The Gujarati diaspora alone, which makes up less
than 0.01 per cent of the population of the USA, is estimated to control over 5 per
cent of that country's wealth (High Level Committee l6g-7D.2
The attempt by the Indian state to attract diasporic capital is not a new
phenomenon. Wthin decades of Independence, the extensively planned Indian
economy combining a strategy of heavy and commodity-based industries teetered on
the verge of collapse. In the face of massive trade deficits, the Indian rupee had been
devalued by 20 per cent by 1967 , with its value seemingly on an inexorably downward
spiral. The Indian government sought to staunch the bleeding of its domestic
economy by looking to the resources of successful Indian 6migr6s (Seshadri). The
decades since the end of the Second World War and India's Independence had led to a
steady stream of migration towards industrialised nations such as the USA, Britain
and Canada, as well as workers who flocked to the oil-rich Persian Gulf. As well, older
diasporic Indian communities 
- 
many the descendents of indentured labourers 
- 
had
deep roots in East Africa, the West Indies and South-east Asia (Motwani, Gosine and
Barot-Motwani).
And the money did flow not only in the form of remittances, but also in the form
of foreign currency deposits. The state-controlled Reserve Bank of India initiated two
programmes in the late 1970s to attract funds in foreign currency from overseas
Indian communities. The first was to create Foreign Currenry Non-Resident
Accounts, which insured the depositor against exchange rate fluctuations by
providing a fixed rate. The second scheme was called the Non-Resident (External)
Rupee Account which offered a higher interest rate without the guarantee of a fixed
exchange rate. By 1982 these initiatives were further refined to make it even more
attractive for NRIs to deposit their money in Indian banks, to invest in and to buy
real estate in India, including offering assured repatriation of funds and a further
2 per cent extra interest on foreign currency deposits held in India (Nayyar).
The success of this strategy to woo NRI money was considerable, although
ultimately it was only a temporary solution. Throughout the 1980s NRI money
helped to balance India's trade deficits but "leakages" in the trade account and
elsewhere helped to substantially offset these gains. Indeed, as V. Krishnamurty
argues, to a large extent the support provided by NRI funds merely put off the
economic reforms that sooner or later needed to be undertaken by the Indian state.
Krishnamurty also points out that diasporic capital has a complex and often
contradictory effect on the receiving country's economy. Deposit flows, he suggests,
come out of savings and wealth, while remittances come out of income. There are two
different trajectories and class implications for these types of diasporic assistance 
-
and possibly two different outcomes. Krishnamurty goes so far as to suggest
"remittances bring down the measured deficit while deposits help to finance it" (7).
The differences between the nature of these forms of diasporic capital 
- 
and the risks
of informally relying on the flow from remittances for financial stability 
- 
became
stark when the growing economic crisis finally reached meltdown status in 1991.
Inflationary pressures, coupled with overvalued exchange rates and rising fiscal deficits
had severely staggered the Indian economy. It could not, however, recover from the
body blow dealt by a series of external shocks, the most severe of which was the 1991
Gulf War. Not only was the Indian state responsible (at considerable expense) for
repatriating hundreds of thousands of workers threatened by war, the flow of foreign
exchange from the Gulf dried up and the sudden spike in oil prices further crippled the
economy. The credit rating of India in the international loan market plummeted, as
commercial lenders shied away. Furthermore, the second part of the diasporic capital
equation 
- 
foreign currency deposits 
- 
abruptly abandoned ship. Nearly US$l billion
in NRI deposits exited the country. Capital flight in general was precipitous, often
citing severe exchange restrictions as the motivation, but also following the general
trend of unease regarding the Indian economy. As a result of this economic collapse,
India was forced eventually to accept a series of economic reforms (aimed at trade
liberalisation) as part of a loan package from the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank, accelerating a process of liberalisation already underway since the late
1970s and early 1980s (Nayyar).
Despite this experience with the problems of looking to 6migr6s and their funds,
the Indian government has continued its pursuit of diasporic capital. Between 1991
and 2001 the central goyernment floated three separate savings schemes. Each
followed a particular political or economic event that placed the Indian state in a
precarious financial position. In 1992, the government issued "India Development
Bonds" following the debt crisis described above. In 1998 and 2000, the government
launched "Resurgent India Bonds" and "India Millennium Development Bonds",
respectively, with the former a direct appeal for diasporic assistance following global
sanctions on India due to nuclear weapons testing. Approximately US$2 billion was
raised by the first set of bonds and roughly US$4t-5 billion by the following two. Each
offering was targeted towards infrastructure financing in India, though in actual
terms less than one-third of the funds were directed in this manner, with the rest
entering general revenues (Bajpai).
The basic assumption underlying these efforts is that despite increasing globalisa-
tion and economic, cultural and political integration across the world, locality, place
and "the nation" all still matter. Preliminary studies of investment by NRIs indicate
that "emotional ties with India" ranks as the single highest motivating factor spurring
these diasporic capital flows (Krishnamurty tl).3 Such surveys would suggest that
diasporic communities demonstrate a strong desire to participate in the material as
well as ideological restructuring of their places of origin.
It is not only "nation" that is of importance in the search for diasporic capital,
however. Several regional goyernments within India 
- 
including those of Andhra
Pradesh, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh 
- 
have established agencies in order to
woo NRI money to their states, playing up notions of not simply "Indian-ness" but
"Marathi-ness" and "Andhra-ness" as well. Parallel in many ways to the nationalist
appeals that laid the foundation for development projects of the early post-colonial
period, these calls by regional governments for extended civic duty to departed sons
and daughters tie identity not to the nation-state, but rather to specific regions and
localities. And as the evidence from other instances of diasporas and development
indicates, the efforts of hometown associations, regions, neighbourhoods and families
have far outstripped nation-states in their ability to raise funds from overseas
connections (Orozco).
The desire for diasporic capital extends in the Indian context beyond the central
and state governments and public sector financing, however. While remittance-driven
development has indeed played a major role in regions such as Gujarat and Kerala,
and the amounts raised by investment schemes such as the India Development
Bonds, Resurgent India Bonds and India Millennium Development Bonds have been
significant, there are multiple other ways in which the influence of the diaspora in
India's contemporary development can be seen and felt. Perhaps one of the most
apparent in the present context has been the impact of diasporic capital, aesthetics
and values on both private and public urban development throughout India's many
cities. The sheer pace and scale of such urban redesign is remarkable and the political,
economic, social and ecological consequences as yet unclear. In cities such as
Mumbai, Delhi, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad, Kolkata and Cochin * to name
but a few 
- 
construction work is booming. "Development" in India today is more
than the infrastructure projects 
- 
dams, highways, irrigation canals, resource
extraction enterprises 
- 
that have traditionally been conjured by the concept. Indeed,
what is most striking about the process of urbanisation in these cities is not the
attempted recreation of the developed world in the image of London, New York or
Paris, but rather as suburban California, Colorado and British Columbia. In rapidly
developing new towns such as Gurgaon (in Haryana, just outside of Delhi), and on
the fringes of a host of other cities, malls, gated communities, entertainment
complexes, country clubs and all the markers of conspicuous middle-class affluence
and consumption abound. Additionally, diasporic investors are increasingly sought to
aid in setting up new businesses, launching joint ventures and establishing trading
ties, all activities that have potentially significant impacts on local communities. In
the final section of this paper, I will examine some of the potentially deleterious
effects that such activities might have.
Dilemmas of Diasporic Longing? Political Involvements and Social Impacts
Much of the discussion regarding development and diasporas so far has focused on
the potential good that these relationships might bring 
- 
development assistance,
economic aid, increased trade, greater cultural connections and understanding, and
so on. The links between 6migr6s and former homelands is often seen through what
Orozco refers to as the "five T's" of transnational practices: transportation, tourism,
telecommunications, trade and transfer of remittances. And for the most part such
practices have been generally discussed 
- 
certainly by the majority of literature on
diasporas and development 
- 
in terms of the benefits they will bring to former
homes. However, many critics have noted that there is nothing inherently positive or
productive about the linkage between diasporas and development. As mentioned
above, an infusion of remittances into a given community may have inflationary
effects on local economies. Additionally, the phenomenon of migrant workers may
lead to a situation of "brain drain" or perhaps more accurately "capacity drain"
whether of doctors, engineers and other professionals from a country's service
infrastructure, or parents who are absent from a local community in order to work as
domestic labour in an overseas location (Ozden and Schiff). Some critics have argued
that in many instances communities supported by remittances often do not have the
institutional resources to maintain the structures and services built through such
funding (Kapur in Maimbo and Ratha). Diasporic assistance in this sense is
detrimental to the broader social health and function of the community imbricated
by the largesse.
Others point out that the range of diasporic transnational practices is not
monolithic but instead governed by differences in class, gender, race, sexuality and a
host of other distinctions. It is not only who is able to invest from savings and who is
forced to remit a portion of income that is at issue here; patterns of migration are
themselves affected by such differences. In countries such as Canada and city-states
such as Singapore, the emphasis is on attracting wealthy entrepreneurs and highly
trained professionals for long-term immigration and seasonal or short-term workers
for lower-skilled wage labour, guests who are rather firmly asked to leave once their
welcome has been worn out (Gaur). It is important to recognise therefore that
development continues to impact diasporas as much as the reverse is true.
Beyond such impacts, actual physical displacement, economic loss and political
repression may represent a further dark side to diasporic involvement in displace-
ment. This has certainly been the case in many of the urban developments described
previously. Hand in hand with these developments have come the wholesale
displacement of the former populations that used to live there, agrarians,
horticulturalists, landless labourers, migrant workers and others. The more fortunate
have found jobs as drivers, domestics and the ubiquitous security guards for the new
housing estates and their affluent denizens; others have been pushed out into city
slums and rural villages and into conflicts with the working poor and marginalised in
those spaces. In some of these situations those evicted are directly making way for the
living spaces of the transnational elites; in others the dislocation is in service of the
lifestyles supposedly embodied in such figures and expressed through the building of
golf courses, country clubs, movie theatres, luxury condominiums and other
amenities.
A similarly problematic case is that of the Narmada Valley Development dams, the
hydroelectric project referred to above whose proponents are now turning to the
wealthy Gujarati diaspora to help bankroll the scheme. This is among the most
controversial development projects in the world that has seen decades of political
infighting amongst the various state governments involved in its construction. The
planned dam has also engendered a vigorous and internationally recognised popular
movement, the Narmada Bachao Andolan, which has fought for the rights of the
hundreds of thousands who would be displaced by the project. If NRIs were to help
facilitate the project with their overseas monies, they would become implicated in a
moral, economic and political quagmire. Their love of country or region might have
led some to "engage with India" as Prime Minister Singh has urged, but it would
result in this case in the disenfranchisement and dislocation of some of the very
people who the diaspora might have believed they were helping through their
developmental "good works" (Kothari).
Of course not all diasporic development initiatives can be categorised under the
umbrella of altruism, charity or duty. Diasporas have long been entangled in
ideological projects to reshape, resurrect, defend or even enlarge homelands, ancestral
or putative. Nationalist struggles and sectarian strife have lengthy histories of overseas
assistance from departed sons and daughters. Fundraising for the Irish Republican
cause in Boston, political support for early twentieth-century Indian nationalism
amongst the Ghadr Party in California, Palestinian and Jewish demonstrations on
behalf of respective positions in Middle East conflicts, or Tamil and Sikh agitation in
Canada for separatist movements in South Asia are but a few examples. This
involvement can take the form of moral support and encouragement, it can manifest
through material assistance in money and materials, and it can erren take the form of
physical presence in armed struggles, as in the case of Canadians of Serbian and
Croatian origin who took part in the civil war in the Balkans (Satzewich and Wong
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Another example more directly related to the idea of development as itself a
political project is the case of the strong support demonstrated by large segments of
overseas Indian communities for the resurgent Hindu right that has dominated much
of Indian politics since the 1990s (Lele; Bhatt and Mukta; Chatterji; Biswas).4 One of
the myriad entities that compris e the Sangh Pariyar, or "family" of organisations that
collectively espouse the ideology of Hindutva 
- 
an aggressive form of right-wing
Hindu nationalism 
- 
is the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP or World Hindu Council).
The VHP plays an important role alongside the official political wing of the Hindutva
movement (the Bharatiya lanata Party or BIP), the "cultural" organ known as the
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), trade unions, professional associations and
women's organisations, amongst many others. Its youth wing, the Bayang Dal, has
been the jack-booted, saffron-shirted muscle behind many of the most notorious
attacks on those deemed to offend against the supposed "Hindu-ness" of India
Christian missionaries, Muslim villagers, lower-caste Hindus and tribal peoples; in
other words, any who do not conform to the national vision of the RSS (Mukta).
Active in fundraising and nationalist calls directed at raising patriotic fervour
especially amongst Indians living abroad or diasporic Indian communities, the VHP
has been tremendously successful at fundraising for the Hindutva cause in places
ranging from the UK to the USA to Australia. In some Indian regions where the
Hindutva movement had proved particularly strong (such as Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh
and other parts of the so-called Hindi Belt), the VHP's success in recruiting overseas
support (and even leadership) for the right-wing cadres has had far-reaching
consequences.s Perhaps most alarming has been the vocal support and justification
offered by some within diasporic Hindu communities in North America and Western
Europe following the pogroms against Muslims in Gujarat in 2002. VHP
functionaries abroad were particularly active in their defence of the shocking events
and sought to minimise the evidence that state authorities were complicit in the
murders and brutalisation of the Muslim community in Gujarat.
A similar controversy has been simmering over the activities and intentions of the
India Development and Relief Fund (IDRF), a US-based, tax-exempt fundraising
initiative meant to concentrate on the "interaction and convergence of development
and relief work, particularly in relation to the needs and welfare of the poor" (India
Development and Relief Fund). To its supporters the IDRF is an invaluable source of
funds and psychological aid for development efforts in education, housing and
sanitation (amongst others) as well as in reconstruction and rehabilitation needs
following natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods. But critics of the IDRF
have pointed out that the vast majority of the funds raised have gone to RSS-affiliated
organisations and have been directed at promulgating Hindutva beliefs under the
guise of relief and development activities, especially in marginalised and tribal areas.
Dismayed by the clear linkages between diasporic-fundraising and the growth of
right-wing politics in India, critics of the IDRF launched a very public and successful
"Campaign to Stop Funding Hate" to highlight these pernicious and problematic
connections (Campaign to Stop Funding Hate).
Conclusion
The significance of diasporic groups in financing development activities, policies and
projects in countries across the world is both considerable and on the increase.
Through remittances, investments, property ownership and cultural influences,
diasporic communities continue to reshape the material, aesthetic and ideological
landscapes of their homeland. In India, diasporic capital and cultural flows have
played a profound role in its recent history, particularly in its economic history. Yet
such connections are not without their costs, sometimes particularly negative ones
such as population displacement. It is for these reasons that groups such as the
National Alliance of People's Movements, a broad-based coalition of grassroots social
justice movements spread across India, have called explicitly for diasporic commu-
nities to participate more knowledgeably and more ethically in their investments in
the "homeland". Transnational solidarity and support networks based in other
countries, such as the Association for India's Development, a US-based organisation,
have similarly urged a focus on ethical behaviour by NRI's, suggesting that members
of the diaspora ask themselves: "What kinds of developments in India are the Indians




While in this paper I have used the term diaspora synonymously with transnationalism, there
is an ongoing debate regarding this conflation. Some have argued strongly that such usage is
problematic and that the term diaspora should be dependent upon the shared experience of
group expulsion and of community-in-exile as in the case of the fewish or the African slave
diaspora (Ong). Others suggest, however, that creating these exclusions are both morally
problematic and analytically unhelpful and that diaspora describes experiences of hybridity
and culture that are not necessarily predicated on primordial ties to either land or blood
(Walsh; Gilroy; Hall). It is in this vein that I have adopted the use of diaspora, as a way of
illustrating the contested, shifting and creative relationships between space, place and power.
Such statistics may help to explain the steady stream of Gujarati politicians making their way
to the USA in recent years, as supplicants to wealthy expatriates, seeking funds for a variety
of causes.
The second highest motivation is the prospect of higher returns on investment, followed by a
stated familiarity with Indian economic conditions.
There has been support across the political spectrum and indeed during the 2004 elections,
several overseas Indians ran as candidates for different parties, one of them winning a seat as
a Congress MP from a rural district outside of Hyderabad while maintaining a corporate and
immigration law practice in Manhattan (Yelaja). However, it is the Hindu right that has been
by far the most successful in encouraging such overseas political activism.
Indeed, one could argue that political battles in Indian states such as Gujarat were being
waged as much in the Garden State as in Gandhinagar, if the number of Gujarati politicians
from all parties making trips to New fersey during the 2002 state elections or in the interest
shown in the polls by overseas Gujaratis was any indication (Nanda and Bhatt).
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